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 ABSTRACT
This article reports findings from research about the tensions between
global commonalities and localised differences in accountability
policies and practices in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Based on
empirical data, it indicates complex and dynamic interrelationships
in globalising processes. There is resentment among academics in
both societies toward the externally derived accountability practices
and China and Hong Kong have both failed to strike a balance
between the state, markets and universities. The findings remind us
again of the crucial importance of local contexts in international
policy borrowing. The theoretical framework adopted in this article
brings together a hybrid of critical and post-structuralist
perspectives to inform the analysis of policy, and allows for a macro
or ‘bigger picture’ at global, regional and national levels, as well
as micro-level interactions within individual institutions to be
examined simultaneously. In-depth understanding was gained by
collecting data in case study universities in different settings. Both
documentary and interview data were collected from each case study
institution. Quotes are used extensively to allow respondents’ voices
to be heard, and an audit trail is provided with respondents coded
for each institution.
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Introduction
Accountability policies have featured in recent educational reforms in
many countries, signalling new relationships between the state, markets
and educational institutions. Despite different national and localised
contexts, a number of common ‘global’ trends have been identified in
the policy domain. Many scholars have argued that globalisation
strengthens the grip of economic competition and carries neo-liberal norms
to every corner of the world. Further, the neo-liberal globalisation agenda
has reduced government funding of public universities and has begun to
unravel the notion that universities exist for the public good. University
managers have been forced to restructure their institutions to avoid fiscal
decline (Eggins, 2003). The university is increasingly subordinated to
capital and to the state on behalf of capital, and the erstwhile collective
mission of public universities and the liberal personal formation of students
are subordinated by market competition and weakened by consumer
subjectivities.
However, the transformation is not complete, nor is it solely
engineered from above by managers and governments, let alone universal
forces of ‘capitalism’ and ‘globalisation’ (Marginson, 2006, p. 46).
Simultaneously context-specific differences are also evident. This article
reports findings from research about the tensions between global
commonalities and localised differences in accountability policies and
practices in Mainland China (hereafter referred to as China) and the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereafter referred to as Hong
Kong).
With empirical data collected at the research sites, this study aims to
contribute to the literature on globalisation and higher education where
one major problem is the tendency for arguments to be based on sweeping
generalisations and abstract theoretical assertions insufficiently connected
to specific historical examples and evidence. There are still too few
studies of the implications of globalisation processes grounded in detailed
examinations of particular historical and geographical times and spaces
(Yang, 2002). Empirical studies are especially lacking in the Asian region.
This article therefore aims to make a contribution to redressing the global
research imbalance.
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The Contexts
Similar to the situation in many parts of the world, there have been
sustained calls in China and Hong Kong for more streamlined governance
structures including smaller councils, fewer committees, appointed rather
than elected deans and heads of schools and greater devolution of
resources with line responsibility (Chan & Mok, 2001). These changes
are to develop “a stronger management model that is more akin to
practices in the private sector” (Sutherland, 2002, p. 6). In both societies,
there is a desire to be competitive internationally and to look to the policies
of other countries to determine the best way to develop ‘world-class’
universities. To achieve this, both governments have adopted policies of
decentralisation to allow more autonomy and flexibility to universities to
induce greater creativity. However at the same time, they have introduced
controls and regulations through accountability.
With its entrance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China
has significantly increased its position internationally as a socio-economic
and geopolitical force, as it has shifted from its isolationist, politics-oriented
policies to open door, economic-oriented policies. This change was
accompanied by major reforms in higher education to support a drive to
modernise the nation (Agelasto & Adamson, 1998). China’s practice
has been described as a ‘deregulated state model’ or an ‘interventionist
state model.’ This model is exemplified by the central government’s
policy push for university mergers (Mok, 2005b) to achieve economic
benefits with an assumption that larger units, based on economies of
scale, would yield qualitatively stronger academic institutions, better
management and more cost-effective use of administrative resources
(Yang, 2000), echoing the situation in many other parts of the world
(Harman & Meek, 2002).
 In a ‘deregulated state model’, the central government maintains a
relatively tight control over higher education policies (Hawkins, 2000),
and also introduces market mechanisms to reduce the burden of financing
higher education alone (Kooiman, 2000). The rhetoric of efficiency is
fast gaining momentum in China (Kwong, 1997), where universities are
under immense pressure to generate revenue. As the Chinese government
moves towards greater delegation of some powers to its universities, it
also attaches more importance to ‘social supervision’ as a way of ensuring
the quality of higher education in the longer term (Xu et al., 2001).
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China started to adopt policies of decentralisation in the mid-1980s
with the Decision on the Reform of the Educational Structure issued by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (1985). It put
emphasis on local responsibility, diversity of educational opportunities,
multiple sources of educational funds and the decentralisation of power
to individual institutions to govern their own affairs. In 1993 the
Programme for Education Reform and Development in China jointly
issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council reaffirmed
this policy and suggested that the central government play the role of
macro-manager through legislation, allocation of funding, planning,
information service, policy guidance and essential administration, while
universities independently provide education geared to the needs of society
under the supervision of the government.
By the late 1990s, through implementing a series of policies of
decentralisation and marketisation, the Chinese government had initiated
fundamental changes in the orientation, financing, curriculum, and
management of higher education (Agelasto & Adamson, 1998). Through
donations and loans, some supra-national agencies have begun playing
an increasingly prominent role in promoting this market ideology. The
influence of the World Bank’s financial power has led to its strategic
collaboration with the central government (Drake, 2001). The OECD,
although with less direct institutionalised involvement, has also been
influential in China’s higher education policy-making. While the WTO’s
potential effect is yet to be realised (Robertson et al., 2002), its impact
on Chinese universities will be more significant via its influence on China’s
economic reforms.
In Hong Kong, the government has initiated policies to redefine the
functions of its universities, introducing quality assurance mechanisms,
diversifying funding sources, and reforming university governance systems
(Mok, 2005a). Block funding and triennial budgets were introduced in
the 1990s in Hong Kong, along with strengthened performance reviews
and incentive funding to make universities more competitive
internationally. Thus, again, enhancing university autonomy has not
necessarily led to reduced state control. The introduction of stringent
measures to hold universities accountable to the government and the
implementation of various kinds of quality assurance activities indicate
recentralisation. Although Hong Kong is less state-centric in its approach
to economic and social change than China, having modelled its universities
on the relatively autonomous British universities during its colonial era
and embraced a more free-enterprise approach, the state does appear
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to have become more interventionist. The government and its University
Grants Committee (UGC) are using the mechanism of ‘steering from a
distance’ to influence the direction of higher education policy (Mok &
Lee, 2002).
The UGC began its quality assurance processes with the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE) and then the Teaching and Learning Quality
Process Review (TLQPR) and Management Review. The RAE was
based on a model from the UK when Hong Kong was still a colony and
it involved an assessment of the quantity of articles published in
international peer-reviewed journals by departments and universities as
a whole, instead of on an individual basis. The TLQPR focused on the
processes that are believed to produce quality teaching (Massy, 1997).
The Management Review examined management practices in the
development of strategic plans, resource application, service delivery,
and information systems. The introduction of these reviews puts pressure
on universities to change their internal procedures to be more in line with
the outputs and principles recognised by the external reviewers.
In both China and Hong Kong, the state remains strong. However,
the impact of globalisation may have altered the state into a more
‘competitive state’ and led to the introduction of market forces within a
framework of public sector management. Both have drawn on the rhetoric
and practices of new public management to deliver their accountability
policies.
Methodology
The theoretical framework adopted in this research revolves around
Ball’s (1994) concept of a ‘policy cycle’, as modified by Vidovich (2002).
The (modified) policy cycle distinguishes three primary contexts of a
policy process for analytic purposes: ‘influences,’ ‘policy text production,’
‘practices/effects.’ The context of influence is where interest groups
struggle over the construction of policy discourses; the context of policy
text production focuses on the who, how and what of the policy text as
it is being produced; the context of practices/effects is where policy is
subject to multiple interpretations by practitioners at the micro level.
Later, two more contexts of ‘outcomes’ and ‘political strategies’ were
added to re-focus on macro-level effects of policies, especially in relation
to changing power relationships between the different institutions of
society. This conceptual approach brings together a hybrid of critical
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and post-structuralist perspectives to inform the analysis of policy. It
allows for the macro or ‘bigger picture’ at global, regional and national
levels, as well as the micro-level interactions within individual institutions
to be examined simultaneously. Therefore, the dialectics between ‘the
global’ and ‘the local’ are foregrounded.
In analysing accountability policy processes in China and Hong Kong,
we gained in-depth understanding by collecting data in four case study
universities in different settings. In each society, we chose universities
that reflected different types of institutions within the sector. The
University of Hong Kong (HKU) and City University of Hong Kong
(CityU) in Hong Kong, and Nanjing University (NU) and Nanjing
University of Science and Technology (NUST) in China were purposively
selected to represent ‘old/traditional’ and ‘new/technological’ universities
respectively. Although different types of universities in each society are
represented, there is no intention to claim generalisability of findings to
all universities in the two societies. However, readers are invited to reflect
on the ‘bigger picture’ themes emerging from the case studies and to
make their own judgments about potential transferability to their own
context (Walford, 2001), as case studies can constitute heuristic devices
that can provide ‘food for thought’ in other settings.
Both documentary and interview data were collected from each
case study institution during 2003-04. Documents were obtained at both
national and institutional levels. There were 21interview respondents in
the two Chinese universities and 39 in the two Hong Kong universities,
and interviews were conducted in Chinese and in English in the two
regions respectively. Respondents represented a range from relatively
junior to senior staff and they came from a range of disciplines across
sciences, arts and humanities. After initial analysis of individual case
studies, cross-case analysis was undertaken to identify common themes
evident across universities within and between societies, and also
importantly, to identify differences within and between them. Themes
emerging from a meta-level cross-case analysis provide insights into
rapidly evolving policies on accountability in higher education within a
context of globalisation.
Findings
Findings are reported separately below for accountability in research
and accountability in teaching, with subsections on China and Hong Kong
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within each to facilitate comparisons. Quotes are used extensively to
allow respondents’ voices to be heard, and an audit trail is provided with
respondents coded for each institution.
Accountability in Research
China
Rigorous mechanisms have been introduced to assess research
productivity in the Chinese case study institutions, with an emphasis on
publications and research grants. In China, publications are ranked in a
clearly defined hierarchy of journals, with international journals in English
at the top, followed by leading national journals, then the ‘core’ journals
in each academic field (distributed both nationally and provincially), and
provincial journals at the bottom. The introduction of these measures
was generally accepted by academics at NU as this quote illustrates:
If a university wants to promote its reputation, research must be
emphasised because it can be seen [measured]. The reputation
of a university has a direct relationship to its ability to acquire
resources. (NU2)
Most respondents noted that research funds were playing a relatively
bigger role when assessing productivity in recent times as ‘the market’
was assuming greater importance. In China, both the amount and source
of funds are considered when measuring research productivity. Research
grants from the national level are the most prestigious (and weighted
more heavily), followed by provincial funds. One respondent noted, “The
national science fund is counted five times. So if an academic has 100,000
yuan in national natural science funds, it is counted as 500,000 yuan
research funds” (NUST8).
An elaborate system of rewards and sanctions has been developed
to foster research productivity and thereby induce Chinese universities
towards performing more competitively on the global scene. The majority
of respondents identified the most potent rewards for research grants
and publications in terms of money for personal use by academics. In
relation to research grants, one respondent noted that it is common for
25% of a research grant to be allocated to a personal account for private
use. Similarly, personal financial rewards for publications in prestigious
English-speaking journals have been sizeable, especially for the most
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prestigious journals such as Science and Nature. Financial incentives
for publications have varied significantly between universities and across
departments within universities, as reflected in the case study institutions.
One respondent at NUST explained:
If your paper is published in a leading journal such as Social
Sciences in China, some universities give 100,000 yuan for the
reward but in our university the reward is only 300 yuan.
(NUST7)
At one faculty in NU, “If publishing a paper in first-tier periodicals,
the award is 2,000 yuan, in the core journals it is 800 yuan” (NU6), but in
another faculty: “an academic would be given 1000 yuan if published in
that first-tier periodical, and for a core journal it has just increased from
200 to 500 yuan” (NU8). In general terms: “If the quality of the journal
is higher, the money will be more” (NU4).
However, more recently, across China, this system of financial
rewards for publications and grants is being phased out, to be replaced
by ‘post allowances,’ which include formalised contractual expectations
of specified levels of research productivity (and teaching workload),
with sanctions for non-compliance. As shown by both case study
universities, the requirements for ‘post allowances’ at all levels differ
from institution to institution. Yet the function remains similar: if an
academic is not publishing enough, it can mean that her/his post allowance
may be reduced by 10-20%. There was almost unanimous agreement
amongst respondents that the mechanisms for research accountability
have significantly increased the pressures on academics to perform at
higher levels.
There are some consistent issues emerging from respondents about
accountability in research, including concerns about quality versus
quantity of publications, lack of defined journal procedures for assessing
papers for publication, dominance of English-speaking journals and the
consequent effect on Chinese research, the short time frames for
measuring productivity, disciplinary tensions in research performance
indicators and the impact of guanxi (building particular interpersonal
relationships for patronage) on research activities.
The issue about quality versus quantity is colourfully illustrated by
one respondent:
To pass the assessment to become a professor, one must have 6-
8 articles, but it’s only the number that counts. Some famous
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people may only have several articles in their whole life but
each is a milestone. Those ‘nasty’ articles are useless. It is like
forcing a gentlewoman to be a prostitute. (NUST8)
The negative effects of quantification of research outcomes as well
as tensions between sciences and arts/humanities are further exemplified
below:
The measure for evaluating research outcomes is quantification. It
is from the logic of science. The spirit of the arts has been thrown
away. The advantage is that it is easy for leaders to do assessments.
The disadvantage is that it is easy to ignore the quality of outcomes.
But if you say pay attention to quality, how can it be measured?
(NU11)
Another major concern was how people could use the system to
produce more papers that previously would have resulted in a single
publication: “Actually people in China cheat. You can write it in one
paper or you can write it in three papers. A lot of people find different
ways to try to publish more” (NU12).
The following comment demonstrates the importance of guanxi in
obtaining publications:
The phenomenon of papers being published because of guanxi
is very serious. In domestic publications if you do not know the
editors, they will not even take a look. The process of sending a
paper to several authorities in the field [peer review] is just
beginning in China, in the first-tier periodicals. It is lamentable
when the human relations factor [guanxi] mixes into it and has
a dominant position. (NUST7)
Concerns were also raised by respondents about the observation
that many Chinese journals only publish papers from the highest ranking
universities and others have little chance of being published, as illustrated
by this example: “The main articles published by the Journal of
Computer Science and Technology are from Tsinghua and Peking
[Universities]. It is very difficult for others to be published” (NUST8).
Most respondents raised the issue of the unfairness of needing to
publish in English to gain prestige for their research. They noted that
Chinese research agendas and priorities are not always welcomed in
international journals and therefore Chinese academics have difficulty in
securing prestigious publication. The flow-on effect is that relevant
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localised Chinese research becomes undervalued. Accordingly, tensions
between disciplines were evident over research performance indicators,
as academics in science and technology are able to publish more in
prestigious, international English journals than those in humanities and
social sciences. Furthermore, science disciplines are more likely to be
able to obtain funding from industry. Competitive differences between
disciplines also translate into competitive tensions between universities,
as in our two case studies where respondents at NU which emphasises
liberal arts and humanities were more likely to be critical of the science/
engineering style productivity measures which favoured universities such
as NUST. There are other ways, too, in which publication counting
fragments the higher education system and exacerbates competitive
tensions, as emphasised by one respondent: “Originally an academic
writes a paper to serve academe. It is not for any specific university.
Now it has become universities scrambling for outcomes” (NUST7).
Despite concerns expressed by respondents about the types of issues
identified above, on the whole, academics in the two cases were more
opposed to the specific measures employed than the general notion of
accountability for research performance, and they argued that the methods
of assessment should be more refined.
Hong Kong
The Research Grants Council (RGC) established under the UGC allocated
a portion of its resources based on the RAEs for the first time in 1991.
RAEs assess departments on the basis of the quality of their research
output. University staff members submit samples of their best research
products and 13 panel members including local and overseas experts
assess these items to determine their quality. A portion (about 20%) of a
university’s block grant is dependent on its performance in the RAE.
This mechanism helps to differentiate Hong Kong universities into
‘research-intensive’ versus ‘teaching-only’ institutions.
The majority of participants in this study wanted fewer research
reviews. While Hong Kong-born participants were more likely to want
fewer RAEs than those born overseas, the harshest criticism came from
the latter. A British-born professor attacked the very foundations upon
which the UGC decided to engage in the RAE exercise:
The RAE was invented to reduce the number of individuals that
would apply for funds and to develop differential research
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activities in universities. It is a method of exclusion. The RAE is
a governmental mechanism to divide and conquer, of the most
obvious and blatant kind. Instead of dealing with the problem
of inadequate financing of the universities, you invent the RAE
[Research Assessment Exercise] which takes a lot of time and of
course, it doesn’t work. It’s blatantly ridiculous in my view.
(CityU108)
The focus on particular prestigious international journals at the expense
of more localised publications, the emphasis on quantity of publications
over quality, and a tendency to benefit scientists more than others all
echo the situation in China, although Hong Kong academics offered
much more criticism, as reflected in the quotes below:
We are concerned that the evaluation criteria may lead to local
and regional journals being further neglected. … you want to
encourage scholarship that is relevant to the community you
are living and working in, particularly for the social sciences.
Yet this RAE exercise in the eyes of our colleagues is too much
of a paper exercise, more for administrative purposes, rather
than really enhancing scholarship. (CityU104)
It seems to have a negative impact on scholarship per se,
encouraging people to publish articles that are so-so, leading
to a glut of publications, many with little substance or originality.
There is no Humanities Index. These measures benefit the
scientists more than the social scientists and those in humanities
are particularly disadvantaged by this system. Humanities
subjects are often culture-bound and area-specific whereas the
sciences have no boundaries. (CityU105)
The rule of the game is that one will get more recognition with
more publications, which is quantity before quality. Another
problem is that arts research is more often than not individual
research that takes longer to do. The medical and science
professors work in teams and their research publications bear
a long list of authors. Arts colleagues end up with fewer
publications and have been ridiculed for not being as productive
and for not doing collaborative research. (HKU107)
People try to publish quantity. So sometimes they cut a paper
into different bits and submit it to different journals. Thus one
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paper can generate five papers. In the past, you would submit it
as a whole. (CityU112)
Also emphasising the issue of the quality of research, an American-
born professor went further to suggest that he “could look good by
publishing lots of articles but this pressure had not been good for his
research because he had given up his major research projects that took
a long time to complete” (HKU105).
Similar to the response in China, some Hong Kong academics
commented on the shift of effort away from teaching and students to
research, as reflected in the quote below:
With this pressure for research somehow we have to cut back
the time and energy we spend on teaching. Honestly, sometimes
I really have to hide myself from the office, stay at home. We will
have to cut back the time we spend on teaching and it will
definitely have an effect on the relationship between staff and
students and it will also affect the collegial and friendly
atmosphere in the department. (CityU101)
With the focus on research assessment, teaching becomes a kind of
punishment, as shown by the following comment:
My teaching load has gone up every year for the past four
years. They differentiate between active researchers and non-
active researchers. Somehow they think that active researchers
are doing well in their research and should be given the reward.
So teaching becomes a punishment for those considered inactive.
(CityU107)
The link between research performance and personal reward or
sanction in Hong Kong is not as direct as that in China. It is mainly
through promotion and not through personal payment for each publication
or grant. There is a concern about scholarship per se and the loss of
intrinsic desire to do research, as evidenced by the following quotes:
A lot of staff members are under great pressure to produce more
publications and they are required to do more research. It means
their salary or benefits are linked to their research output. Some
colleagues have a very outstanding publication record and they
are promoted. (CityU102)
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A loss is in the originality, in the control and excitement you feel
about doing your own research. There is nothing internal now
that drives me to finish an article. I think the problem with
accountability in Hong Kong is that they take it to mean
‘countability’ not answerability to reason. You have to prove
your merit to a bureaucracy that can only credit countable items.
(HKU105)
These comments from both China and Hong Kong indicate a great
deal of concern about the long term consequences of research
assessments that use quantitative performance indicators and compliance
measures rather than any attempts to create an authentic research culture
in universities.
Accountability in Teaching
China
In 2000, the Ministry of Education (MOE) in China appointed a specialist
group to develop a program for evaluating undergraduate teaching.
External assessment began in 2002 and by 2005 over 180 universities
and colleges had been assessed. The rest will be evaluated by the end of
2007. After that, all institutions will be assessed every five years.
Provincial governments also engage in teaching evaluations. Within
universities, both students and senior academics evaluate teaching
performance.
There are both national and provincial awards for excellence in
teaching. However, teaching awards usually only involve a small amount
of money for personal use, and respondents largely saw them as token
gestures, compared with rewards for research grants and publications.
At the institutional level, the MOE might force a university to stop
recruiting students in particular programs if teaching is not deemed to be
of a suitable standard. For individual academics, in extreme cases, poor
evaluations from students and senior staff could result in their removal
from a teaching position. At NU, “If you do not improve you are shown
a ‘yellow card’. If there is a ‘teaching accident,’ you are shown a ‘red
card.’ If there are several teaching accidents, the problem will be serious”
(NU5).
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As with research, accountability for teaching is changing towards a
system of penalty for ‘poor’ performance rather than reward for ‘good’
performance. Some respondents believe that if a teacher scores poorly
on student evaluations and ‘peer’ observation, this will be reported to
the faculty and that teacher is likely to have his/her post allowance reduced
by 10-20%. Also as with research, respondents did not have a very
clear understanding of how readily such sanctions are put into practice,
given the relative newness of this reform.
Key issues amongst respondents about teaching performance
measures included the effect of guanxi; the difficulty of defining and
measuring ‘good’ teaching; the pressure from public shaming of teachers
deemed to be ‘poor;’ and the lack of quality control over postgraduate
teaching/supervision.
For many respondents, there was no apparent relationship between
teaching scores on formal evaluations (from students and academic
‘peers’) and rewards for good teaching, such as promotion. Again guanxi
was seen to significantly interfere with any attempts to render teaching
assessment procedures transparent. For example, one respondent noted
that recognition and promotion on the basis of teaching quality “depends
on how an academic builds relationships with the leaders. This is a very
corrupt phenomenon” (NUST7). However, the phenomenon of guanxi
in teaching assessments was mentioned much less explicitly and less
often at NU than at NUST.
The difficulty of defining and measuring ‘good’ teaching was raised
as an issue by most respondents. Compared with research, there were
very negative reactions toward teaching evaluation mechanisms, although
most respondents maintained that some form of teaching evaluation was
important. The validity and reliability of measurement instruments were
in question, as well as the seriousness with which students and academic
colleagues completed checklists of teacher competencies, as reflected
in these quotes:
The university asks students to tick the boxes. There are dozen
of items to tick. I do not think that students take it seriously.
Some of them are very impatient and do it carelessly. It is hard
to see the credibility it has. (NUST8)
We are required to observe each other. Some teachers are very
busy and they have no time to go to the classes of colleagues;
what they do is to tick the form without observation and hand it
in. (NUST8)
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A number of respondents commented on the pressure resulting from
the public ‘shaming’ of teachers deemed to be of ‘poor’ quality. For
example at NUST: “The scores given by students will be released in
public every year, therefore teachers feel more pressure” (NUST6).
Even at NU where teaching evaluation scores are not publicly available:
“For a teacher who does not teach well, firstly the teacher will feel
embarrassed. Students would go to the teaching administration office
and say that if next term the subject is still taught by this teacher, they
would not attend class. It is invisible pressure but stronger than visible
pressure” (NU10).
The lack of quality control over postgraduate supervision was
identified as an issue by many respondents. Postgraduate supervision is
seen as research, not as teaching. It is largely ignored in teaching
performance measures. Further, the nature of the relationship between
supervisor and student is not seen as conducive to such formal evaluations
as indicted by one respondent: “In China, the relationship between the
supervisor and student is considered to be ‘like family’ and therefore
student complaints about supervisors are rare, although they will complain
in private, not in public” (NU10).
Hong Kong
In terms of teaching in Hong Kong, each university maintains external
(usually overseas) examiners who look at course structures and examine
the assignments and exams that are submitted by students in most units
every year. While such traditional mechanisms still exist, new
accountability mechanisms such as the TLQPR are becoming significant.
The results of our interviews showed that academics did not object as
much to the TLQPR (which focuses on processes rather than outcomes)
as they had to the RAE in Hong Kong. The overall feeling was that the
TLQPR had a positive impact on improving teaching. However, responses
suggested there was little staff development support to improve teaching
and if one was a good researcher, then poor teaching would be overlooked.
When asked about the measures introduced to evaluate teaching,
the most frequent response was student evaluations in the form of teaching
surveys. Many also mentioned peer reviews. There were schemes in
both case study universities to reward teachers, such as Teaching
Excellence Awards at both the faculty and university levels, with
monetary prizes. For those who were seen as very poor teachers, the
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sanction was the lack of a contract renewal, an increment, promotion or
substantiation.
Overall, there are clear mechanisms, rewards and sanctions that
accompany teaching evaluations in Hong Kong. A professor at CityU
noted this as follows:
I think everybody takes it very seriously because especially when
they say that the outcomes will inform funding. I think when
they say that, everybody agrees that we should take teaching
seriously and nobody objects. I think the TLQPR gives you the
push now, with the carrot and the stick. I think it helps formalise
a lot of mechanisms. It really brings it out as an important issue
on a day-to-day basis. We all agree that we have to teach well.
(CityU116)
However, compared with research, the link between teaching
performance and personal rewards or sanctions is weaker. This echoes
the situation in China, although sanctions there are much more substantial.
I don’t think it [TLQPR] is effective because of the overriding
emphasis placed on research as opposed to teaching. It is not
common for this university to penalise individuals for poor
teaching. (HKU107)
If you want to achieve merit in teaching, then you will put in a
lot of energy, resources, time, and effort so that hopefully you
might be able to get the award for teaching excellence. But not
too many people get that award and not too many people are
even motivated to get it. As long as they are doing quite well
and not being complained about by students, I think that’s it.
(CityU107)
I think for departments that have been performing, it is a good
exercise. I don’t think it has any impact on departments that
have not been performing. There are no punitive measures. No
matter how well or how badly you do, it has minimal resource
impact. (HKU109)
Similar to their Mainland Chinese colleagues, Hong Kong academics
also expressed their concerns with the fact that teaching excellence
would not be as important as research publications in getting promoted,
and higher teaching loads were used as a negative sanction for those
who did not publish enough. They were also concerned about the
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difficulty in evaluating teaching, as demonstrated by the following
comments by a senior manager and a professor from HKU:
I think people accept the processes in place but the difference
is how much importance should be attached to the processes
and how much we should look at the outcomes. Outcomes are
hard to determine. The UGC has tentative indicators that show
what is not acceptable but whether these are good indicators,
for example income from graduation, is doubtful. (HKU111)
Concluding Remarks
Our comparisons between China and Hong Kong demonstrate the complex
and dynamic interrelationships in globalising processes (Vidovich, 2004).
There is a dialectic between global trends and local responses, a process
of give-and-take, and an active exchange by which international trends
are reshaped to local needs. The interplay between ‘the global’ and ‘the
local’ means that forces from the local and the global could collide on
the one hand, or exogenous forces could adapt to local conditions on the
other. Our findings show that there is much national and local variation,
and we interrogate the merely descriptive and schematic description of
the impact of globalisation on universities in the face of a highly complex
problem (Marginson, 2006).
Our findings confirm the great anxiety among academics generated
by the penetration of a corporate culture into the university. The new
accountability mechanisms in both societies are introduced in a context
of commodification of education, which involves changes in the meaning
and experience of education, what it means to be a teacher, a learner
(Ball, 2005), and a researcher. The fact that market measures have
been embraced much more in China, a country still claiming to be socialist,
with a highly centralised higher education system, deserves special
attention. This study finds that, by far, the commodification of education
has affected the universities in China much more seriously than in Hong
Kong, due to China’s shortage of the necessary institutional infrastructure
support.
Another contextual factor that is important in interpreting our findings
is the policy rhetoric of building ‘world-class’ universities: very much a
dominant discourse in East Asia, especially in China and Hong Kong.
The prevailing rationale provided by governments for introducing
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accountability in both societies is to create ‘world-class’ universities that
are led by the major ones in the US and UK and shaped by Anglo-
American linguistic and cultural hegemony. This reminds us again of the
crucial importance of local contexts in international policy transfer: what
is ‘good for the goose’ may not necessarily be ‘good for the gander.’
Indeed, our findings indicate that there is a lack of focus on the local
policy context (Steiner-Khamsi, 2005) due to a policy agenda steered by
globalisation (Currie, 2003), and emanating from the powerful external.
Policy makers in both societies are taking on external (often American)
approaches uncritically rather than developing their own (Yang, 2006).
An insightful comment was made by a scientist and senior manager at
CityU (Hong Kong) who questioned the effectiveness of the reviews
especially those that use outside experts because they do not have the
cultural knowledge of Chinese universities and how they operate in Hong
Kong:
I don’t think it actually helps a great deal. Personally I think
management is more of a cultural thing. Although universities
in Hong Kong and universities in Australia have a lot in common
but when you’re dealing with people, I think Chinese are quite
a bit different from Australians. And you send in some expert
from the UK or from the States or anywhere and you try to
understand how this place is run. They say, “You should do this
and you should do that.” I don’t think that works. I really don’t
think it was effective. It was a waste of money as far as I’m
concerned. (CityU109)
Governments in both China and Hong Kong have imposed a more
managerialist ethos on universities. Even though universities were
supposedly given more autonomy to run their own institutions, the overall
effect of these managerial accountability mechanisms has been to
implement a ‘new public management’ regime that was introduced by
outside experts and imposed from the outside, top down. Both, however,
have failed to strike a balance between the state, markets and universities.
One major reason for their failure has been the ignorance of local
conditions and actors. There is, thus, an urgency to stress local needs in
an era of globalisation, as illustrated by the following comment by a
professor in Hong Kong, a response that may sound similar to those that
his colleagues in the Mainland might voice about external forces on China
as well:
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Hong Kong is in a peculiar situation in that until 1997 it was a
British colony and the RAE and the TLQPR are mirror images of
what’s going on in the UK. So it’s not so much a response to
global trends. I think Hong Kong needs measures that are more
in tune with its own circumstances. (CityU106)
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